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ABSTRACT. Essence and causation are fundamental in metaphysics, but tittle is said 
about their relations. 1 Some essential properties are of course causal, as it is essential to 
footprints to have been caused by feet. But I am interested less in causation's role in 
essence than the reverse: the bearing a thing's essence has on its causal powers. That 
essence might make a causal contribution is hinted already by the counterfactual element 
in causation; and the hint is confirmed by the explanation essence offers of something 
othelwise mysterious, namely, how events exactly alike in every ordinary respect, like 
the bolt's suddenly snapping and its snapping per se, manage to disagree in what they 
cause. Some prior difference must exist between these events to make their causal powers 
unlike. Paradoxically, though, it can only be in point of a property, suddenness, which 
both events possess in common. Only by postulating a difference in the manner - essential 
or accidental - of the property's possession is the paradox resolved. Next we need an 
account of causation in which essence plays an explicit determinative role. That account, 
based on the idea that causes should be commensurate with their effects, is that x causes 
y only if nothing essentially poorer would have done, and nothing essentially richer was 
needed. 
1. COMMENSURATION 
" W h a t  kind of thing is a cause,  or  an  effect? A n d  supposing that  x and  
y are of the right k ind,  what  should they be  like specifically, for x 
actually to cause y?" .  This paper  considers  bo th  ques t ions  in the bel ief  
that  their  answers are connected .  A m o n g  other  things,  it argues that  
causes and  effects have essences; that  causal  proper t ies  are hypothetical 
ra ther  than  categorical;  and  that  how a thing is essential ly is relevant to 
its causal  propert ies .  2 Al l  of  this is supposed to follow on  a de t e rmined  
appl ica t ion of the pr inciple  that  causes are (in a sense to be  explained)  
' c o m m e n s u r a t e '  with their  effects. 
Of  our  two quest ions ,  the first, abou t  the type of thing apt to s tand 
in causal re la t ions ,  is relat ively recent .  3 Tradi t ional ly ,  causal  theorists  
concen t ra t ed  on  the second,  namely ,  what  makes  one  thing of tha t  type  
the cause of ano the r?  H u m e  and  Mill, for example ,  address it in the 
form: Must  the cause take in  everything requ i red  for the occurrence  of 
its effect, or  can it comprise  just  a select ion out  of that  mater ia l?  In  
saying that  "we must  reject  the dis t inct ion be t w e e n  cause and  occasion, 
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when suppos'd to signify anything essentially different from each 
other", 4 Hume hints at an affirmative answer, an answer explicit in 
Mill's thesis that the true cause is seldom "a single antecedent" of the 
effect, but  rather "the sum of several antecedents; the concurrence of 
all of them being requisite to produce, that is, to be certain of being 
followed by [the effect]".5 Both philosophers also ask whether the cause 
can include anything not needed for the effect. Again, they tend to 
agree that it cannot. Thus Hume: 
In almost all kinds of causes there is a complication of circumstances of which some are 
essential, and others superfluous; some are absolutely requisite to the production of the 
effect, and others are conjoin'd only by accident. 6 
By means of his "rules by which to judge of causes and effects", he 
says, 
we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes; and 
when we find that an effect can be produc'd without the concurrence of any particular 
circumstance, we conclude that that circumstance makes not a part  of the efficacious 
cause, however frequently conjoined with it. 7 
Mill, of course, credits his famous "methods of experimental enquiry" 
with a similar capability. On the Hume/Mill theory, then, the cause 
includes all, and only, factors required for the effect's occurrence. 8 
Probably Hume and Mill went too far in imposing so rigorous a 
condition on causes. Few would deny that my slamming the door 
startled the hamsters on the ground, e.g., that it was enough that the 
door got slammed, irrelevant that it was me who slammed it. But even 
if they were wrong in their specific thesis that the cause comprises all 
and only what the effect requires, they were surely onto a correct 
general principle: nothing causes an effect that leaves out too many 
relevant factors, or brings in too many irrelevant ones. True causes, as 
I will put it, are commensurate with their effects. 
2. S I Z E  A N D  S T R E N G T H  
Two related issues are tangled up in the idea of commensuration: one 
about the cause's size or extent in space and time; and another about 
the cause's reach along a quite separate axis. Take size first, concerning 
which Mill has a good example: 
When the decision of a legislative assembly has been determined by the casting vote of 
CAUSE AND ESSENCZ 405 
the chairman,  we somet imes  say that  this one person was the cause of all the  effects 
which resulted from the enactment .  Yet we do not  really suppose that  his single vote 
contributed more  to the result than  that  of  any other  person who voted in the  affirmative. 9 
Because votes cast elsewhere, and presumably earlier, contributed to 
the effect, the alleged cause is extensively incomplete. Obviously a 
complementary possibility is that it should be extensively excessive. 
According to Mill, what causes the coming of day is "the existence of 
the s u n . . ,  and there being no opaque medium in a straight line be- 
tween that body and the part of the earth where we are situated", and 
this "without the addition of any superfluous circumstance". 1° Since it 
is superfluous that night obtained earlier, the given conditions plus the 
fact of recent night are rejected as involving more than the effect 
needed. 
That causes should arrange themselves along spatiotemporal lines is 
not surprising, nor is it surprising that they should be comparable in 
spatiotemporal extent. In Davidson's well-known discussion of Mill's 
strictures on causation, he introduces, inadvertently I think, a new 
dimension of comparison: 
'The  cause of this match ' s  lighting is that it was struck. - Yes,  bu t  that  was only part of 
the  cause; it had to be a dry match,  there had  to be adequate  oxygen in the  a tmosphere ,  
it had  to be struck hard enough,  etc. '  We ought  now to appreciate that  the  'Yes,  but '  
comment  does not  have the  force we thought .  It cannot  be that  the  striking of this match 
was only part  of  the cause,  for this match was in fact dry, in adequate  oxygen, and the 
striking was hard enough.  11 
What I find troubling here is the absurdity of the misapprehension 
that Davidson's bland reminders seem aimed at correcting, viz., that 
what is partial about the striking per se is that it lacks the causally 
important properties mentioned. To think that would be to think that 
the striking per se was a lackadaisical striking of a wet match in a 
vacuum, or, even more incredibly, that it was somehow indeterminate 
on all these points. 
Well, what else could the 'yes, but' comment be getting at? Another 
of Davidson's examples has a bridge's collapse said so be caused, not 
by the bolt's snapping as such, but by its snapping so suddenly. 12 Taking 
our inspiration from the match example we might protest as follows: 
How does the first snapping fall short  of  the second? From their descriptions it seems 
that  there is to be a distinction in point  of  suddenness .  But  both are sudden (there is no 
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non-sudden snapping here in question). So the problem is the same as before: to explain 
how things can differ on a property which, manifestly, they both possess. 
Is this really so mysterious, though? If things both of which possess a 
property are to differ in point of that very property,  their difference 
can only lie in the manner of its possession. To give this difference a 
name, only one of the two occurrences has the property constitutively. 
If the bolt 's suddenly snapping does bet ter  than its snapping per se at 
causing the bridge's collapse, that is because it is constitutively sudden, 
whereas the other  is sudden just as a matter  of fact. 
3. PROBLEMS FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
With this we pass from a rather familiar position on our second question 
- that causes should be commensurate with their effects - to a rather 
unorthodox position on the first - that causes have some of their 
properties constitutively and others not. To repeat  the steps: commen- 
suration presupposes that causes are proport ionable to their effects; for 
that,  they must be comparable in size and strength; but  to be compar- 
able in strength, they must be of such a type as to show an inherent 
preference for certain of their properties over others. The view that 
they do show such a preference I will call constitutionalism about causes. 
By comparison with the more usual view that causes are concrete, in 
the sense of possessing all of their properties on a par, 13 constitutional- 
ism has a lot of explaining to do. What are constitutions, that things 
with different of them can still be overwhelmingly similar in other  
respects? How can things as similar as that still differ in what they 
cause? And of what possible relevance can their constitutions be to 
their ability to influence events? 
All of these are understandable concerns, but I suspect that it is the 
last that mainly accounts for consfitutionalism's continuing unpopular- 
ity. Hume and Mill are again a good place to start. Both lay great stress 
on what I have been calling commensuration,  sizewise and strengthwise, 
too. 14 Yet,  although this sounds like a situation tailor-made for the 
constitutional approach, and although both occasionally 'talk the 
talk',15 they seem in the end not to approve of the invidious distinctions 
that constitutionalism requires. ~6 They had reasons from elsewhere in 
their philosophies for disliking such distinctions, of course, and ques- 
tions of causal ontology were not in any case foremost in their minds. 17 
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But another  factor in their neglect of constitutionalism might have been 
simply this: that they did not see what help it would be in the quest for 
commensura te  causes. For  how can a thing's preferences among its 
propert ies affect its causal powers? 
Whether  precisely this difficulty occurred to H u m e  and Mill or not, 
in Davidson 's  critique of Mill it comes up often: 
How could Smith's actual fall, with Smith weighing, as he did, twelve stone, be any more 
efficacious in killing him than Smith's actual fall? 18 
By emphasising Smith's weight we might improve our explanation of 
his death, but to think that the cause could be improved by a similar 
emphasis is just a confusion. Here  is Jonathan Bennet t  in the same 
spirit: if "what  got him down was not (so much) her refusing him but 
(more) her refusing him rudely",  and if these "differ only in their 
constitutions, not in their characters",  then 
the refusal that did not get him down (so much) was just as rude as the other, but it 
lacked the other's depressive powers because rudeness was not in its constitution . . . .  
That, however, should make us suspicious. All the popular theories of event caus- 
ation.., agree with clamorous common sense that the causal powers of any event depend 
upon what it is fike, what properties it has, what its character [as opposed to its consitu- 
t ion]  is. 19 
To answer this would be to explain how a thing's constitution can be 
relevant to what it causes. But  first we need to say something about  
constitution itself. 
4. E S S E N C E  2 0  
By essentialism, I mean the view that things have some significant 
quota of their propert ies  essentially, the rest only accidentally. 2a So 
understood,  essentialism has a surprising consequence for identity: 
things exactly alike in every ordinary respect (location, shape, size, 
mass, microphysical makeup,  etc.) may nevertheless fail to be numeri-  
cally the same. That  will be the case, whenever  x and y agree in their 
ordinary propert ies  but differ in which of those propert ies they possess 
essentially. 
For  the most  part ,  essentialists concede this result, 2z but  try to mitig- 
ate it by postulating intimate identity-like relations compatible with 
strict distinctness: composition, instantiation, generation, comprisal,  
and the like. But,  not to minimise these relations'  importance,  their 
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differences distract us from a more fundamental relation they imply in 
common. Suppose we use the term categorical for properties whose 
possession by a thing x is a matter  of x's actual condition, as opposed 
to what it would or could have been like (other properties, e.g., disposi- 
tional and modal properties,  are hypothetical). 23 Then the relation I 
am thinking of is this: x is coincident with y iff they have their categorical 
properties in common. 
Beware of reading the categorical/hypothetical distinction as just a 
paraphrase of the accidental/essential distinction. For one thing, prop- 
erties are accidental only in relation to specified particulars and worlds, 
but they are categorical simpliciter. More revealingly, for P to be acci- 
dental to x at w is partly a matter  of how x is at w (x must have P at 
w) and partly a matter  of how it is at other  worlds (x must lack P in 
at least one such). But,  P is categorical if its attaching to x at a world 
is wholly a matter  of how x is at that world, absolutely without regard 
to its otherworldly behaviour. Thus it should come as no surprise that 
hypothetical properties,  for instance dispositions, can be accidental; 
and that categorical properties can be essential, as mountains are (I 
suppose) essentially spatially extended. 
Though the distinctions are different, they can be related through a 
certain notion of essence. Essences I will understand as sets of essential 
properties: x 's essence is a set of properties essential to x, y 's essence 
is a set of properties essential to y, and so on. But which of a thing's 
essential properties go into its essence? 
The simplest proposal, obviously, would be to include all of them. 
Unfortunately,  essences so defined will not meet  our needs. What we 
are after, among other  things, is an account of comparative strength as 
discussed in Section 2; and such an account will presumably be in terms 
of inclusion relations between essences. The problem is that these 
inclusion relations are liable to be disrupted, if essences are not some- 
how restricted. Allowing identity with x into x 's  essence, for example, 
precludes the possibility of a y whose essence includes everything in 
x 's  essence and more besides. And the effect of allowing x 's  kind into 
its essence is to ruin the chances for a thing y whose essence exceeds 
x 's  by properties which things of that kind possess at best accidentally. 24 
Is there an approach that avoids this difficulty? For  the essences of 
nonidenticals to be comparable they should be drawn from a pool of 
properties such that any particular such property 's  modal status - essen- 
tial or accidental - is without undue prejudice to the modal status of 
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the others. Since to include properties like these in essences does 
nothing to impede the later entry of their companions, I call them 
c u m u l a t i v e .  Although I do not know how to specify the cumulative 
properties outright, their most important features can be summed up 
in a simple condition. Letting x 's  essence be the set of cumulative 
properties that it possesses essentially, and letting x ÷ s t rengthen  x 
(x + 1> x) if x 's  essence is a subset of x+'s, the condition is that 
(K) For  all x, for all possible worlds w, for all sets S of cumulative 
properties: x exists in w and possesses there every member  
of S ¢~ there is an x +/> x which exists in w and to which 
every member  of S belongs essentially. 
That  is, x exists and possesses a set of cumulative properties (in a 
world) iff there exists also (in that world) a strengthening of x to which 
those properties attach essentially. 
Applying (K) in the right-to-left direction, with S equal to the empty 
set, gives: 
(1) If x ÷ >1 x ,  then necessarily, if x ÷ exists, so does x. 
Applied from right to left, with S the difference between x÷'s essence 
and x's, it implies: 
(2) If x ÷ i> x, then necessarily, if x ÷ exists, x possesses every 
property in x÷'s essence. 
And we get: 
(3) If x ÷ t> x, then necessarily, if x exists and possesses every 
property in x+'s essence, then x + exists, 
by (first) running (K) from left to right with S the essence of x ÷ - this 
to obtain the existence of an x* I> x ÷ - then (second) using (1) to infer 
the existence of x + itself. To illustrate, if the speeding strengthens the 
driving, then the driving occurs in every world in which the speeding 
does; and in all such worlds, and only them, the driving is done at a 
high speed. 
When one thing strengthens another,  as the speeding strengthens 
the driving, the difference between them is m er e l y  hypothetical if any 
difference is (ultimately it comes down to the fact that x ÷ essentially 
possesses properties that are accidental to x). But,  if only hypothetical 
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properties can distinguish x + from x, then a property is categorical only 
if it c a n n o t  distinguish them: 
(C) P is categorical ~ for all x and x ÷ such that x ÷/> x, and for 
all possible worlds w in which both exist, x has P in w iff x ÷ 
has P in w. 
Thus x and its strengthening x ÷ are categorically indiscernible, or coinci- 
dent, in every world where both exist: 
(4) If x + I> x, then necessarily, if x and x + exist, they are coinci- 
dent. 
For  instance, the bolt's suddenly snapping is categorically indiscernible 
from its snapping per se, not just in this world but in every other where 
they exist together.  Understanding a relation to hold essen t ia l l y  between 
xl and X 2 when necessarily, it holds if Xl and x2 exist, (4) can be put 
by saying that if one thing strengthens another,  they are essentially 
coincident. 
Strengthening is not  the only form of coincidence, though, nor  do 
all coincidence relations hold essentially. Imagine that x and y ,  although 
neither strengthens the other,  have (in world w) a strengthening z in 
common. Then by (4), z is coincident in w with x and y, whence x and 
y are coincident in w, too. To turn this observation to advantage, 
assume that: 
(U) For  every x, and every world w in which x exists, there is 
an Xw >! x which exists in w alone. 
Again by (4), x and xw have the same categorical properties in w; and 
since xw exists in a single world only, xw possesses these properties 
essentially. Thus every detail of x 's worldly condition is essential to xw, 
which licenses us in referring to it as x's s ta te  in w. Now suppose that 
x and y are in the s a m e  state in w, that is, there is a z existing in w 
alone that strengthens both of them. Then by the same argument as 
before,  they are coincident in w: 
(5) Necessarily, if x and y are in the same state, they are coinci- 
dent. 
With the help of one further assumption, we can strengthen (5) to a 
necessary biconditional: 
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(6) Necessarily, x and y are in the same state iff they are existent 
and coincident. 
That assumption, independently plausible, is that: 
(N) x and y are distinct ~ either they exist in different worlds, 
or they are noncoincident in some world where both exist. 
Suppose that x and y exist in w and are coincident there. By (4) and 
(U), Xw and Yw are existent and coincident there, too. Since Xw and Yw 
exist in no other world but w, they exist in the same worlds and are 
coincident in all of them, which by (N) makes them identical. So x and 
y are in the same state in w. That proves (6)'s right-to-left direction; 
(1) and (5) imply the other. Assuming that things in the same state in 
one world can be in distinct states in others, (6) supports the claim 
above that it is possible for coincidence relations to hold accidentally. 
(An example might be the coincidence of a statue with its constituent 
clay (see Gibbard 1975).) 25 
5 .  C O N S T I T U T I O N  A S  E S S E N C E  
At the end of Section 2, constitutions were proposed as a way of 
reconciling the following assumptions: 
(i) the bolt's suddenly snapping has different causal powers 
from its snapping per se; 
(ii) there must be some prior difference between them, to ac- 
count for this; 
(iii) this prior difference must be in point of suddenness; but 
(iv) they are exactly alike in every ordinary respect, suddenness 
included. 
These can all be true together, I said, if, although both snappings are 
sudden, only one of them is sudden constitutively. But I acknowledged 
that the proposal may seem to raise more questions than it answers. 
What are constitutions? How is it that disparately constituted entities 
can be otherwise so similar? And how can things as similar as that still 
differ in their causal powers? 
What recommends essentialism is that it gives a way of approaching 
these questions. Constitutions are essences. Because essential proper- 
ties, that is properties of the form being essentially P, are hypothetical, 
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things can differ essentially while still being categorically just the 
same. 26 Lastly, if causal properties are hypothetical (see below), then 
it is only to be expected that categorical duplicates will sometimes differ 
in their effects. 
To me this is motivation enough for the essentialist account, or at 
least for pursuing it further. But some may feel that it runs so far 
counter to modal intuition that it cannot be taken seriously as it stands 
(at best it bears some fortuitous formal analogy to the correct account). 
Well, what are our intuitions here? Few would find it strange to say, 
of Brutus's stabbing Caesar, that Caesar might have survived it if the 
knife had been blunter; or of the sinking of the Titanic that, if certain 
hatches had held, it might have stretched out over hours or days. 27 Yet 
to say these things of Brutus's killing Caesar (that Caesar might have 
survived it) or of the Titanic's swiftly sinking (that it might have taken 
days) is incomprehensible. 28 These are far from being isolated hunches. 
With expert medical attention Caesar might have pulled through; in 
that cae, the stabbing would have occurred in the killing's absence. 
Likewise the Titanic's sinking, if had been sufficiently prolonged, would 
have occurred without the Titanic's swiftly sinking. 29 Essentialism may 
not be the only interpretation of these data but it is certainly the most 
straightforward one. 
Essentialism about causes is a theory of their common nature; to 
stretch a phrase, it is a theory of "what they are". However it could 
be held - and I do hold 3° - that essentialism applies to all particulars 
whatever, regardless of categorial or other differences. So if the ques- 
tion is, not what causes are, but what they are as opposed to other 
things, essentialism is rather a minimal position. Nevertheless I propose 
to add very little more: only the commonplace, anticipated in one or 
two incautious formulations along the way, that they are things which 
take place or happen, thus events or occurrences or happenings of some 
sort. 
Notice that even this would be to say too much, if events were (as 
on some theories) inherently coarse-grained. 31 Whatever else is true of 
causes, there needs to be a distinct one for each of the finely discrimi- 
nated causal roles they are called on to fill. An opposite worry would 
be that the proposal is not explicit enough; that the needed distinctions 
are so extraordinary that they can be provided for only on some special 
basis, e.g., by intensionalising events, or endowing them with internal 
structure. 3z But, on the first point, it is only concrete events that are 
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inherently coarse-grained, and, on the second, fine-graining comes 
automatically with our freewheeling background essentialism. So the 
most straightforward course is to treat causes simply as events with 
essences; or, since everything has an essence, simply as events. 33 
6. C A U S A L  P R O P E R T I E S  A S  H Y P O T H E T I C A L  
Above we distinguished categorical properties from hypothetical, but 
said nothing about how the distinction bears on causal properties. To 
any ordinary way of thinking, I suggest, causal properties are hypothet- 
ical. For instance, we see, or think we do, a strong connection between 
x's causing y and its being such that without it y would not have 
occurred. But whether x has the latter property depends on what goes 
on in nonactual situations. 
Another sort of evidence that causal properties are hypothetical 
comes from our essentialism about causes. Recall that properties like 
that of causing a certain effect are liable to discriminate on grounds of 
strength, e.g., the bolt's suddenly snapping has different effects from 
its snapping per se. But events related by strengthening are categorically 
alike. If there is a causal difference between them, then, it can only be 
hypothetical. 
So causal properties must be hypothetical to tell categorical duplicates 
apart; it is a further point that their being hypothetical clarifies how 
they do this, or, to put it the other way around, how essence manages 
to be causally relevant. For a case can be made that a thing's essential 
properties enjoy a certain preeminence relative to its other hypothetical 
properties, causal properties included. To possess hypothetical property 
P is to lead a certain kind of counterfactual life, amounting finally to  
the possession of such-and-such categorical properties in such-and-such 
counteffactual situations. But, how a thing categorically comports itself 
across its counteffactual environments is a function of how it is essen- 
tially. Here then is the form (only that) of a mechanism connecting 
essence to causal powers. Sections 7-10 suggest one way, perhaps not 
the only way, in which the mechanism might actually work. 
7. E F F E C T S  A S  C O N T I N G E N T  O N  T H E I R  C A U S E S  34 
In the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume describes 
cause and effect as items such that "if the f i r s t . . ,  had not been, the 
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second never had existed". 35 As an analysis or definition of causation, 
this is of course extremely doubtful. 36 But as the de facto generalisation 
that, other things equal, x causes y only if: 
(C) If x had not occurred, then y would not have occurred, 
Hume's  remark verges on truism. Calling y contingent on x when x and 
y satisfy (C), the truism is that effects are, other things equal, contingent 
on their c a u s e s .  37 (Here and throughout,  'if it had been that P, then it 
would have been that Q' is counted true in a world w iff Q is true in 
the P-world best resembling w. 38) 
Because the contingency condition makes no overt mention of es- 
sence, its essence-sensitivity can easily be overlooked. Suppose that it 
was irrelevant to Socrates's death that he guzzled the hemlock, rather 
than simply drinking it. Then Xanthippe is mistaken when, disgusted 
at her husband's sloppiness, she complains that his guzzling the hemlock 
caused his death. Assuming that the drinking would still have occurred 
if the guzzling hadn't ,  contingency explains the error nicely. Even 
without the guzzling, the death would still have followed on the drinking 
(the details would naturally have been different). If not for the drinking, 
though, the death would not have occurred at all. So the effect is 
contingent on the weaker antecedent, but not the stronger. 39 
Implicit in the example is an argument that as properties irrelevant 
to y accumulate in x 's  essence, y's contingency on x is threatened. 
Suppose that x possesses many such irrelevancies essentially. Then x's  
absence from the nearest x-less world is liable to signify nothing more 
than the failure there of a property not implicated in y's production. 
Since the failure of that sort of property should not take y out of 
existence, it will be false that y would not have occurred if x had not, 
i.e., false that y is contingent on x. To the extent then that effects are 
contingent on their causes, it damages x's credentials for the role of 
cause if irrelevant properties are too often essential to i t .  4°  
8 .  C A U S E S  AS A D E Q U A T E  F O R  T H E I R  E F F E C T S  
Most counterfactual theories of causation put the contingency condition 
front and centre; they refine it in light of counterexamples and surround 
it with caveats, but genuinely collateral conditions are rare. To the 
outsider this is surprising, since naively one expects some sort of ad- 
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equacy condition complementary to contingency. Here  are two reasons 
why such a condition seems desirable. 
When Xanthippe attributed Socrates's death to his guzzling the hem- 
lock, she overestimated the actual cause. But causes can also be essen- 
tially underestimated. Some examples: whatever Admiral Poindexter 
might think, it was not his testifying to Congress, as such, that caused 
his downfall; rather his lying to Congress was to blame. But where 
Xanthippe's mistake is subject to correction by the contingency con- 
dition, Poindexter 's  opposite error  is not,  for the indictment and so on 
were no less contingent on his testifying than on his lying. Or suppose 
someone suggests Zsa Zsa Gabor ' s  driving (rather than her speeding) 
through the police radar as what led to her detention, or attributes the 
officer's abrasions to her touching his face (rather than her slapping it). 
Again, these attributions strike most of us as wrong, but the contingency 
condition is unbothered.  
Apart  from the examples, a new condition is needed to complete a 
powerfully, if obscurely, felt symmetry in the character of causation: if 
the cause is a that without which not, it is also a that with which. 
Probably the main reason for adequacy's neglect is that this second 
notion has resisted all attempts at counterfactual analysis. Neither of 
the obvious candidates seems to work. When (C)'s antecedent and 
consequent are negated, we get: 
(A1) If x had occurred, then y would have occurred also; 
when we transpose them the result is: 
(A2) If y hadn' t  occurred, x wouldn't  have occurred either. 
Although (A1) is not wrong as a condition on causation, it follows 
trivially from a more basic condition - that x and y should actually occur 
- to which adequacy is intuitively quite unrelated. 41 (A2)'s problem is 
worse: it approaches on being incompatible with a more basic condition 
and hence with the causal relation itself. To cause y, x must be causally 
prior to it. But if x is causally prior to y, then it is probably not the 
case that it would not have occurred if y hadn't;  rather x would have 
occurred as ever, but the causal train from x to y would have been 
derailed at the last minute. 42 
So where (A 0 is vacuous, (A2) is for the most part unsatisfiable. 
Avoiding both extremes is the condition that: 
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(A) If x had not occurred, then i f  it had, y would have occurred 
a s  well 43 
(i.e., y occurs in the nearest x-containing world u to the nearest x-omit- 
ring world v to actuality). (A) would be vacuous - it would follow 
automatically from the existence of x and y - if the nearest x-containing 
world u to the nearest x-omitting world v was, whenever x actually 
existed, the actual world. But why should it be? More likely, the actual 
world sits in the interior of a neighbourhood of x-containing worlds, 
whose outskirts contain worlds nearer to the nearest x-omitting world 
than the actual world is. Unlike (A1), then, (A) is not vacuous. Unlike 
(A2), it doesn't  ask too much: it will be satisfied whenever it is correct 
to say 'suppose that x had not occurred; then y would have occurred 
if x had'.  This seems, in any case, a reasonable test of intuitive ad- 
equacy. For the question is whether x, introduced into the actual cir- 
cumstances minus x, brings y in its train. And it is hard to think what 
the actual circumstances minus x could be, if not the circumstances that 
would have obtained if x had not occurred. 44 
Imagine a bridge designed so that, given time to respond, it shifts its 
weight away from failing bolts. To take advantage of this design feature, 
special 'soft' bolts are used which snap readily but seldom abruptly. 
This particular day, alas, our bolt has just begun to give way when 
molecular bonds along the fracture line improbably deteriorate. The 
snapping is thus accelerated, and the bridge, lacking time to rearrange 
itself, collapses in a heap. Now, since the bridge would not have col- 
lapsed at all if the bolt had snapped less abruptly - we can even assume 
that this would have resulted in a stabler overall comportment - it was 
not the bolt's snapping per se that caused the collapse. Adequacy 
explains this as follows: given the unlikelihood of the molecular mishap, 
if the snapping had not occurred, it might well not have been sudden 
if it had; hence the bridge might well not have collapsed. Speaking 
then of how things would have been if not for the snapping, it cannot 
be said that if it had occurred, so would have the bridge's collapse. 45 
In other words, the snapping per se was not adequate for the collapse; 
and that is why it was not the cause. 
Again the underlying mechanism is worth noticing, both for its own 
sake and for the connection it suggests between x's  essence and its 
causal powers. Properties accidental to x are potentially ones that it 
lacks in u, the x-including world most similar to the x-excluding world 
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v most similar to actuality. In proportion then as x's causally important 
properties are accidental to it, the chances increase of its lacking, in u, 
some of the properties by which y was caused. This raises in turn the 
likelihood that y is absent from u, i.e., that x is inadequate for y. So, 
adequate causes cannot have too many of their causally important 
properties only accidentally. 
9. E F F E C T S  A S  R E Q U I R I N G  T H E I R  C A U S E S  
When a cause is essentially overestimated, as, e.g., when Xanthippe 
blames Socrates's death on his guzzling the hemlock, this often shows 
itself in a violation of the contingency condition. Not always, though. 
Imagine that Socrates is a sloppy eater who infallibly guzzles what he 
drinks. Then his death might, I suppose, be contingent on his guzzling 
the hemlock; but Xanthippe is as unconvincing as ever when she calls 
it the effect of his doing so. Or imagine that Poindexter, his testimony 
complete, attends the symphony, where his talking so irritates his fellow 
concert-goers that he is ejected from the hall; and moreover that, 
although this plays no role in his ejection, he knows what he is saying 
to be untrue. To attribute Poindexter's ejection to his lying as opposed 
to his talking seems hardly credible. Yet if Poindexter is talking only 
to pass along misinformation, the ejection may well be contingent on 
both. 
Where do these attributions go wrong? In both cases one wants to 
say that not all of the proposed cause was needed. Included in the 
guzzling, for example, was a lesser event, the drinking, which would 
still have done the job even in the guzzling's absence. By hypothesis, 
of course, without the guzzling this lesser event would not have oc- 
curred; but that doesn't stop us from asking what would have happened 
if it had, and evaluating the guzzling on that basis. Accordingly we 
define x as required for y iff: 
(R) Given any x-  strictly weaker than x, if x-  had occurred 
without x, y would not have occurred. 
Among its other advantages (see below), (R) gives the intended result 
that Socrates's guzzling the hemlock is not what killed him. For the 
guzzling was required for the death only if there was no strictly weaker 
event such that, if it had occurred in the guzzling's absence, the death 
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would still have ensued. Socrates's drinking the hemlock being a coun- 
terexample to this, his guzzling the hemlock is rejected as not required. 
Against the essentiality of causally irrelevant properties, I complained 
that too much of it jeopardises the contingency of effect on cause. But 
the argument had a loophole. All that follows from x's possessing 
causally irrelevant properties essentially is that there are some worlds 
from which x is absent for causally irrelevant reasons. This leaves it 
open that in the nearest x-less world v, x's absence is for failure of one 
or more of its causally relevant properties. In that case, we would expect 
y not to occur in v. So the threatened conflict with contingency need 
not always materialise. 
With condition (R), this loophole can be partly closed. Remember 
that (C) concerns itself with the nearest world from which x is absent 
for whatever reason. Subject though to the availability of suitable weak- 
enings, 46 (R) shifts the focus to the nearest worlds from which x is 
absent specifically for lack of causally irrelevant properties. For y to be 
missing from the former world is understandable, but its existence 
should not be threatened if, as in the latter worlds, properties are 
lacking on which it is not in any case causally dependent. 47 So essential- 
but-irrelevant properties are likelier to result in violations of (R) than 
of (C); this consolidates our earlier conclusion that properties of the 
cause unneeded by its effect cannot be too often essential to it. 
1 0 .  C A U S E S  A S  E N O U G H  F O R  T H E I R  E F F E C T S  
Adequacy was used to explain why the bolt's snapping per se could 
not be blamed for the bridge's collapse. But this required a special 
assumption: that if the snapping had not occurred, it might well not 
have been sudden if it had. Suppose instead that when the temperature 
is extremely low, as on this occasion, soft bolts snap suddenly if at all. 
Barring an implausible counterfactual dependence of the temperature 
on the bolt, it would have been just as cold if the snapping had not 
occurred. But then, given the effect of cold on soft bolts, if the snapping 
had occurred, it would still have been sudden, and the collapse would 
still have followed. Since now the snapping is adequate for the effect, 
the problem with taking it for the cause lies elsewhere; and the obvious 
thought is that although the snapping was part of the cause, the effect 
required more. Suppose we call x enough for y if: 
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(E) For all (actually occurring) x ÷ strictly stronger than x, y does 
not require x +4s 
Because the bolt's suddenly snapping was required for the bridge's 
collapse, its snapping per se was not enough. 
Adequate causes, I said, cannot have too many of their causally 
relevant properties accidentally. However, the argument I gave was not 
airtight. There is a conflict with adequacy only if x lacks some causally 
relevant property in world u specifically (as before, u is the nearest x- 
including world to the nearest x-omitting world to actuality). But all 
that follows from such a property's being accidental to x is that x lacks 
it in some world or other; and why should the property choose world 
u to put in its nonappearance? Fortunately what happens in u is not 
decisive, where the enoughness condition is concerned: subject to the 
availability of suitable strengthenings and weakenings, 49 enoughness 
homes in on the nearest worlds in which x 's  relevant but accidental 
properties do fail. These being worlds in which the effect is unlikely to 
eventuate, this increases the pressure on causally relevant properties 
not to be accidental. 5° 
1 1 .  P R O P O R T I O N A L I T Y  A N D  C A U S A L  O N T O L O G Y  
By proportional events, I mean events satisfying the contingency, ad- 
equacy, requirement, and enoughness conditions: 
(C) (If x had occurred, then) if x had not occurred, neither 
would have y; 
(A) If x had not occurred, then if x had occurred, y would have 
occurred as well; 
(R) For all x -  strictly weaker than x, if x -  had occurred without 
x, y would not have occurred; and 
(E) For all (occurring) x ÷ strictly stronger than x, x ÷ is not 
required for y. 
(Call the conjunction of these conditions (P).) Whether x is proportional 
to y is sensitive, I have been arguing, to the content of x's essence, 
specifically to how well its essence lines up with the properties by 
which y was brought into being. To the extent then that causes are 
proportional to their effects, x's essence bears similarly on its causal 
powers. 
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At this point it seems that we have answered the skeptical challenge 
of Section 3: what possible difference can an event's essence make to 
what it causes? Yet a major issue has been dodged. Up to now I 
have been talking as though proportionality was a single well-defined 
condition. But from (P)'s logical form one sees that its demands inten- 
sify as its quantifiers range over more and more events. Equivalently we 
could say that the condition (P) expresses is a monotonically increasing 
function of its quantificational domain - what I will call causal ontology. 
The question is, how strong or weak a condition can (P) be made to 
signify by variation in this ontology? 
Imagine an ontology so meagre that events have no coincidents but 
themselves (xl is coincident with x2 only if they are identical). Since 
strengthening entails coincidence, none of these events is strictly 
stronger than any other. (R) and (E) are therefore trivialised, and (P) 
collapses into (C) and (A), the contingency and adequacy conditions. 
So that is one extreme. For the other, suppose we call x necessary for 
y iff y cannot - metaphysically cannot - exist without it, and sufficient 
for y iff x cannot exist without y. Unless x is necessary and sufficient 
for y, it turns out, there is room, reliably exploitable by an ontologically 
unscrupulous monkey wrencher, for a counterexample to the hypothesis 
that x is required by and enough for y.51 Depending on causal ontology, 
then, (P) can mean as little as contingency-plus-adequacy, or as much 
as necessity-plus-sufficiency. 
Now, I take it that neither of these extremes is tolerable: the second 
makes (P) absurdly overdemanding, 52 and on the first the commensur- 
ation ideal is all but surrendered. How though to find the happy me- 
dium? Suppose we conceive the problem operationally: starting from 
a modest foundation, say an ontology with no nontrivial coincidence 
relations, and building upwards, does there emerge at some point a 
natural brake on the construction? The more ontology grows, we know, 
the more commensurate (P)-related events become. What we'll discover 
is that too much commensuration is a bad thing; and this for reasons 
that make themselves felt before we arrive at the upper extreme just 
noted. 
To fix ideas, consider the course our process takes with a specific 
causal episode, say, Lucy's demolishing a sandcastle with a rock. Rela- 
tive to the going ontology, we find, say, that x = her dropping that rock, 
is proportional to y, the castle's breakup. Now let the pool of events 
be gradually enlarged. As (P)'s demands increase, we are forced to 
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nominate new causes in place of the old, each momentarily satisfying 
us until further events make their way onto the scene and the cycle 
repeats. For instance, the sequence (xl) of causes might begin like 
this (the letters in the right-hand column indicate whether (R) or (E) 
motivated xi's rejection); 
Xl = x = her dropping that rock (R) 
x2 = her dropping a rock (E) 
x3 = her dropping a large rock (R) 
x4 = her dropping a large object (E) 
x5 = her dropping a large object from above (R) 
the sandcastle 
x6 = her propelling a large object in the (E) 
direction of the sandcastle 
x7 = her propelling a large and heavy object (R) 
in the direction of the sandcastle 
Xs = the propulsion of a large and heavy (E) 
- object in the direction of the sandcastle 
x9 = the propulsion of a large, heavy, stable (R) 
object at a good velocity in the direction 
of the sandcastle 
Of course, even X 9 will not satisfy us for long. How slowly the object 
can afford to be moving depends on how heavy and stable it is; and 
how heavy it needs to be depends likewise on its size and velocity, 
whose permissible values depend in turn on the gravitational and other 
forces then in effect. So even at this relatively early stage we seem 
driven to something like: 
x* = The propulsion of a suitably large and heavy, suffi- 
ciently stable object at an adequate velocity towards the 
sandcastle in the presence of appropriate gravitational 
forces and the absence of effective electromagnetic in- 
terference, 
where 'suitable', 'sufficient', 'adequate' ,  'appropriate', and so on, are 
to indicate that these parameters should assume mutually satisfactory 
values relative to the goal of achieving the castle's collapse. Describing 
events like this as dedica ted  to their effects helps to underline that their 
conditions of occurrence are of the form (exaggerating somewhat): 
there obtains s o m e  such combination of the given factors as will result 
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in the effect's occurrence. What we are after is a rationale for excluding 
dedicated events from our  ontology. 
Associated with Aristotle is the idea that certain outcomes, what we 
might ordinarily call 'accidents', are not as such caused. To borrow one 
of his examples, there may be a cause for your  entering the market  at 
4 p.m.,  and a cause for your  debtor 's  entering it then; we may even 
suppose that these combine to form a cause of your  both entering it at 
4 p.m. But if your  meeting was, as we say, accidental, we would 
precisely not  expect to find a cause for your  entering the market  at the 
same time. 53 Neither do we expect a cause if, as in the O. Henry  story, 
someone receives as a Christmas present the very thing that she can 
no longer use. There  may be causes for her receiving what she did, and 
for her changed situation, but nothing accounts, on an intuitive level, 
for their discord as such. 
Although I have no foolproof  definition to offer, it seems character- 
istic of accidents that they essentially specify the relations among several 
causally independent  parameters but without prejudice to their separate 
values (e.g., that you enter at the same time, but not  the time you 
enter).  Rough as it is, this suggests that our reluctance to ascribe causes 
to accidents is what one would anyway expect from the commensuration 
principle. For  what would an accident's commensurate cause be like? 
On the one hand, it would have to arrange for each of the causally 
disconnected factors in whose rapport  the effect consists to respect the 
others; on the other  hand, it could not fix these separately on pain of 
overshooting the mark. The problem is to see how the first condition 
can be met without sacrificing the second, s4 
Accidents do not,  per se, have causesY But accidents are what we 
are dealing with, in causes dedicated to their effects. Take,  for instance, 
the strange event x*: the propulsion of a suitably large and heavy, 
sufficiently stable object at an adequate velocity towards the sandcastle 
in the presence of appropriate gravitational forces and in the absence 
of effective electromagnetic interference. As with the other  accidents 
mentioned,  x* occurs i t  there obtains some such combination of factors 
as meets a certain externally imposed condition (in this case, that of 
securing a certain effect). What  we said about the other accidents 
therefore applies here: it is obscure how any prior event could hope to 
coordinate these factors without constraining them beyond what x* 
requires. 
Along with the problem of finding causes for dedicated events, there 
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is a problem finding effects for them to cause. Thus our original cause 
x (Lucy's dropping the rock) is at least roughly commensurate with not 
only y (the collapse) but any number of other events: the sensation of 
release, the twins' cry of alarm, the honeybee's sudden flight, etc.; and 
it goes with this that relative to a moderate, although not an extrava- 
gant, causal ontology, x will come out proportional to all of them. Not 
so with x*, which stands little chance of proportionality with any but 
the collapse. It is not required, because, e.g., it makes no difference 
to the honeybee's flight if the projectile is so unstable that it disinte- 
grates just on reaching the castle; and it is not enough, because, e.g., 
there would have been no sensation, if the propulsion had been ac- 
complished by mechanical means. So the contemplated additions to 
causal ontology reduce overall effectiveness in two ways: both by under- 
mining preexisting causal relations (like that between x and y); and by 
their own relative ineffectiveness (x* causes little else but y). 
Summing up, as events are multiplied in the interests of causal preci- 
sion, they suffer in accountability on the side of their causes, and 
versatility on the side of their effects. As a whole the causal order 
becomes fragmentary and disconnected; ultimately we find ourselves in 
a world whose every outcome derives from an unmoved mover dedi- 
cated precisely to it. Yet with too few events proportionality cannot 
carry out its assigned task of enforcing commensuration. I conclude 
that the right ontology, for purposes of causal theory, is the one that 
strikes the best overall compromise between commensuration on the 
one hand, and the unity and integrity of the causal order on the other. 
12. W O R L D - D R I V E N  V S .  E F F E C T - D R I V E N  C A U S E S  
"Surely, though, an objectively ideal compromise is not to be hoped 
for; so the above leaves the question of causal ontology partly open".  
So much the better, I argue now. 
Inspiring the commensuration constraint is a certain platitude: the 
cause is the thing that 'made the difference', in the obtaining circum- 
stances, between the effect's occurring and its not. But the platitude 
can mean more than one thing, according to which of two related 
contrasts we want the cause to mark. First is the contrast between 
worlds where the effect goes on to occur and those where it doesn't: x 
is to be the choice-point, as it were, between these two types of future. 
Second is that between the actual world and worlds where the effect 
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does not occur: x is to indicate how the choice of a y-containing future 
is implemented here as opposed to elsewhere. 56 
Mill gives the example of a man dying from a bad meal: "[I]f a 
person eats of a particular dish, and dies in consequence, that is, would 
not have died if he had not eaten of it, people would be apt to say that 
his eating of that dish was the cause of his d e a t h " Y  But is the cause 
his eating poisonously tainted oysters, or his eating those oysters? Apart  
from context,  it could be either. Which way we go depends on which 
of the just-mentioned contrasts we have mainly in mind. Intent of the 
first contrast, and concerned to find the antecedent that marks off the 
effect-worlds f rom the others, we look for an x which essentially in- 
volves what it took for the effect to occur: in this case, the man's eating 
poisonously tainted oysters, never mind exactly which. Like any event, 
x occurs in some determinate way, but  its essence homes in on those 
aspects of its occurrence critically implicated in y 's  production. But 
suppose our  aim is to say what specifically happened in the actual world, 
to make it one of the worlds in which y occurred. Then we look for an 
event which brings out how actuality contrived to realise these critical 
aspects: in this case, the man's eating those oysters. So, where the first 
sort of cause emphasises what the effect needed in order  to occur, the 
second indicates something of how its needs were in fact met. 5s 
Two elements have been distinguished in causal judgement.  Both are 
present,  to greater or lesser degree, practically whenever we nominate 
one event as another 's  cause. Where  the first element predominates,  
and x is tailored to the effect's causal requirements,  I call the judgement  
effect-driven; where the second element predominates,  and x is con- 
siderate of how those requirements are in the event fulfilled, I call it 
world-driven. So to blame the man's death on his eating tainted oysters 
is to make an effect-driven judgement;  the retort  that it was his eating 
those oysters that killed him is world-driven. Again, your  judgement is 
effect-driven, if you attribute Rumpelstiltskin's furious stamping to the 
miller girl's guessing his name, or Icarus's fall to his flying so near the 
sun; world-driven, if you propose instead her saying "Rumpelsti l tskin",  
or his flying so high. 59 
Assuming that neither of these attributional styles is to be privileged, 
how on the present theory can we make room for both? This is where 
causal ontology returns to do useful work. Enlarging it, we saw, turns up 
the commensuration pressure on would-be causes. Relatively incidental 
features of the causal scene, distinctive though they might be of the 
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actual progress of events, are worn away to reveal the steadier causal 
currents beneath. Such a strategy can of course be taken too far (a 
theme of the last section). Practised in moderation, though, it brings 
on an agreeable broadening and deepening of causal judgement, what 
I described by saying that these judgements become less world- and 
more effect-driven. Sometimes, it is true, we are willing to accept a 
shallower causal story in return for more discriminating information 
about what took place; in that case an easing of commensuration pres- 
sures is called for and hence a reduced causal ontology. So, if the 
question is: isn't ontology something to be settled uniquely, and identi- 
cally across applications? - my reply is that this is a common assumption 
but not always a useful one. Underlying as it does a familiar and 
advantageous flexibility of causal judgement, the openness of causal 
ontology, at least, is all to the good. 
13. E P I P H E N O M E N A L I S M  60 
Writing to Descartes in 1643, Princess Elisabeth requested an explana- 
tion of "how man's soul, being only a thinking substance, can determine 
animal spirits so as to cause voluntary actions". 61 Dualism has been 
struggling to dissociate itself from epiphenomenalism ever since. The 
outlines of the problem are clear enough: if mind and body are meta- 
physically separate, as the dualist says, then how can the one affect the 
other? Three centuries of dualist apologetics on the topic have failed 
to provide an answer. 
Why though should this old problem concern anyone today? Dualism 
is an evolving doctrine, and its Cartesian version has by now given way 
to something far less outlandish, to which Elisabeth's original complaint 
about the obscurity of cross-category interaction no longer applies. 
Immaterial minds are gone, and although mental phenomena (facts, 
properties, events) remain, the contemporary dualist admits, in fact 
insists, that they are physically realised. All that survives from Car- 
tesianism is the denial of their numerical identity with their physical 
bases. Surely it would be hard to imagine a dualism more congenial to 
mind/body causation than this! 62 
Indeed it would. But epiphenomenalism has been evolving too, and 
in its latest and boldest manifestion, this is all the dualism it asks 
for. The paradoxical result is that, at a time when the prospects for 
accommodating mental causation seem little short of ideal, epipheno- 
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menalist anxiety runs higher than ever. Nor is this a pretended anxiety, 
put on for dialectical purposes but posing no genuine danger to estab- 
lished views. Some say we must simply make our peace with the fact 
that "the mental does not enjoy its own independent causal powers". 63 
Others would renounce (distinctively) mental entities altogether, rather 
than see them causally disabled. 64 
Radical as these proposals are, they are backed by a rather straight- 
forward line of thought: "How can mental phenomena make any causal 
difference to what happens physically? Every physical outcome is cans- 
ally assured by its physical antecedents; its mental antecedents are 
therefore left with nothing further to contribute". This is the exclusion 
argument for epiphenomenalism. Here is the argument as it applies to 
mental events; for the version that applies to properties, replace 'event 
x' with 'property X':65 
(1) If an event x is causally sufficient for an event y, then no 
event x* distinct from x is causally relevant to y (exclusion).66 
(2) For every physical event y, some physical event x is causally 
sufficient for y (determinism).  67 
(3) For every physical event x and mental event x*, x is distinct 
from x* (dualism). 
(4) So: for every physical event y, no mental event x* is causally 
relevant to y (epiphenomenalism). 
This is bad enough - as Malcolm says in 'The Conceivability of Mechan- 
ism', it calls into question even the possibility of speech and action - 
but a simple extension of the argument seems to deprive mental phe- 
nomena of all causal influence whatsoever. Every event z of whatever 
type is metaphysically necessitated by some underlying physical event 
y, whose causally sufficient physical antecedents are presumably suffi- 
cient for z as well. But then by the exclusion principle, mental phenom- 
ena are entirely causally inert. And now it is not only speech and action 
that are endangered but also thinking. 
Now, it is important that the exclusion argument raises two problems 
for mental causation, one about mental particulars (events) and the 
other about mental properties. Their evident similarity notwithstanding, 
philosophers have tended to treat these problems in isolation and to 
favor different strategies of solution.68 Easily the most common reaction 
to the first is to insist that mental events are identical with (some among) 
physical events, whose causal powers they therefore s h a r e .  69 Such a 
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response is at best incomplete, because of the second problem. Mental 
events are effective, maybe, but not in virtue of their mental properties; 
any causal role which the latter might have hoped to play is occupied 
already by their physical r i v a l s .  7° Although someone could, following 
the line above, attempt to identify mental with (some among) physical 
properties, this response is now discredited; the argument bears examin- 
ation, since, appropriately modified, it seems also to cast doubt on 
token identity. 
When philosophers abandoned the hope of finding for every mental 
property an identical physical property, their reason was that mental 
properties seem intuitively to be multiply realisable in the physical. 71 
But some care must be taken about what this means. Sometimes it is 
claimed that for any pair of properties, one mental and the other 
physical, something could have the first without the second. Really, 
though, this is stronger than intended or needed. Imagine a philosopher 
who holds that necessarily every thinker is spatially extended. Presum- 
ably she could also accept multiple realisation, intuitively understood, 
without falling into inconsistency. But, since the necessitation of exten- 
sion by thinking is the necessitation of a physical property by a mental 
one, her view actually runs contrary to multiple realisation as just 
explained! Provided that they are suitably unspecific, then, physical 
properties can, compatibly with multiple realisation, be necessitated by 
mental properties; which suggests as the thesis's proper formulation 
that M necessitates no physical properties specific enough to necessitate 
M in return: 
(M) Necessarily, for every mental property M, and every physical 
property P that necessitates M, P necessitates M asymmetri- 
cally, i.e., possibly something possesses M but lacks P. 
For purposes of refuting the type identity theory, note, (M) is all that's 
needed. Assume for contradiction that M is P. Then P necessitates M. 
But then by (M), a thing can have M otherwise than by way of possess- 
ing P, contrary to their assumed identity. 
What is not often noticed is how easily the above adapts to mental 
and physical events. Take, for instance, a pain sensation s, and some 
underlying brain event b alleged to be identical with s; and grant the 
identity theorist that b at least strengthens the pain. The problem is 
that as b takes on the degree of essential physical detail without which 
the pain is not necessitated, the likelihood increases that the pain is 
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possible even in b 's  absence. Something like this is one of Kripke 's  
arguments  against token identity: 
[B]eing a brain state is evidently an essential property of b (the brain state). Indeed, even 
more is true: not only being a brain state, but even being a brain state of a specific type 
is essential to b. The configuration of brain ceils whose presence at a given time constitutes 
the presence of b at that time is essential to b, and in its absence b would not have 
existed. Thus someone who wishes to claim that the brain state and the pain are identical 
must argue that the pain could not have existed without a quite specific type of configur- 
ation of molecules. 72 
Prima facie, it seems obvious that  the pain could still have occurred, 
even if that  specific configuration of molecules hadn' t ;  and, as Kripke 
says, the prima facie appearances  aren ' t  easily defeated. But  if the 
molecular  configuration is essential to b alone, then b strengthens s 
properly or asymmetrically. Extended across mental  and physical events 
in general,  this amounts  to an analogue for particulars of the multiple 
realisability thesis: 
(m) For  every mental  event m, and every physical event p which 
strengthens m, p strengthens m asymmetrically. 
By (m), any physical p specific enough to strengthen a mental  event m 
is too specific to be  identical with m. Token  dualism follows, by the 
same reasoning as before.  
Isn ' t  this playing into the epiphenomenalis t ' s  hands, though? If  m is 
distinct f rom p,  then m can influence an outcome only to the extent 
that p leaves that  outcome causally undecided. Effects which p causally 
guarantees,  then, it renders insusceptible to causal influence f rom any 
other  source, m included. Assuming, for instance, that all it took for 
me to wince, clutch my brow, and so on, was my antecedent  physical 
condition, everything else was strictly by the way. Since my headache 
is a different thing f rom its physical basis, it is not a bona fide causal 
factor in my headache behaviour.  
H o w  plausible we find this argument  depends on how much rivalry 
we admit  be tween an effect 's would-be causal antecedents.  Does  x ' s  
causal sufficiency for y really make  all of y ' s  other antecedents irrelev- 
ant? Such a view implies, absurdly, that y owes nothing to x ' s  causal 
73 antecedents,  or  to the causal intermediaries by which x generates y! 
A t  least as it applies to events, then, the exclusion principle is over- 
drawn; but not, or  not yet, in a way that  helps with the prob lem of 
mental  causation, for the charge against mental  causes is that they are 
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preempted by underlying physical causes to which they are bound, not 
causally, but in some more intimate metaphysical association. Next we 
consider what their relation could be, that events related in that way 
do not compete for causal influence. 
For the reasons given, I find no fault with type- or token-dualism, 
or with the picture of mental phenomena as necessitated by physical 
phenomena which they are possible without. Rather than objecting, in 
fact, to the asymmetric necessitation picture, I propose to go it one 
better. It will be easiest to begin with mental and physical properties. 
According to a still reputable traditional doctrine, some properties 
stand to others as determinate to determinable, e.g., scarlet is a determ- 
inate of red, red is a determinate of coloured, and so on. Since the 
distinction is relative, one does better to speak of a determination 
relation, where: 
(a) P determines Q iff to be P is to be Q, not simpliciter, but in 
a specific way. 
As traditionally understood, 74 determination involves conceptual and 
metaphysical elements jumbled confusingly together. Metaphysically, 
the main idea is that: 
(A) P > 0 75 only if: (i) necessarily, for all x, if x has P then x 
has Q; 
(ii) possibly, for some x, x has Q but lacks 
P. 
Not always distinguished from this a requirement of asymmetric concep- 
tual entailment: there is no conceptual difficulty about Qs which are 
not Ps, but the reverse hypothesis is conceptually incoherent. 
Now, just as the discovery by Kripke and Putnam of a posteriori 
necessities upset the conceptual equivalent condition on property-ident- 
ity, TM it also invites a reconsideration of the conceptual condition on 
determination. Let K be some highly specific micromechanical property 
chosen so that necessarily, whatever is K is at temperature 90°C. As- 
suming that warmer or cooler Ks cannot be ruled out on conceptual 
grounds alone, K does not determine the temperature property, at least 
not in the full-blown traditional sense. Or let the pertinent aspects of 
my physical condition be encoded in some physical property P, such 
that unthinking Ps are metaphysically impossible. Again, barring some 
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unsuspected conceptual entailment from physics to thought, traditional 
determination fails. 
Yet the relevance of these conceptual possibilities to the properties' 
metaphysical relations is obscure; and since it is only the metaphysics 
that matters to causation, it seems wisest simply to drop the second, 
epistemological, component of the traditional doctine, and to conceive 
determination in purely metaphysical terms. 77 This of course opens the 
way to treating K as a determinate of the temperature property, and 
(what is of course the point) P as a determinate of thinking. 
Then why not see all mental properties as determinables of their 
physical bases? Such a view is in fact implicit in the reigning orthodoxy 
about mind/body relations, namely, multiple realisation (M) plus the 
supervenience thesis: 
(S) Necessarily, if something has a mental property M, then it 
has a physical property P that necessitates M .  78 
By (S), anything with a mental property has a necessitating physical 
property, which by (M), necessitates the mental property asymmetri- 
cally. Necessarily, then, something has a mental property iff it has 
a physical property by which that mental property is asymmetrically 
necessitated. But this is extremely suggestive, for with 'determines' 
substituted for 'asymmetrically necessitates' it becomes: 
(D) Necessarily, something has a mental property M iff if it has 
also a physical determination P of that mental property; 
and (D) is an instance of the standard equation for determinables and 
determinates generally, viz., that something has a determinable iff it 
has some determinate falling thereunder. It is hard not to hear this as 
an argument that, as (D) says, mental/physical relations are a species 
of determinable/determinate relations. 
Properties stand in the determination relation iff for a thing to possess 
the one is for it to possess the other, not simpliciter, but in a specific 
way (this was (A) above). But this way of putting things comes nat- 
urally, too, in connection with particulars, and especially events. If p 
is the bolt's suddenly snapping, and q is its snapping per se, then for p 
to occur is for q to occur in a specific way, viz., suddenly; likewise for 
my slamming the door to occur is for my shutting it to occur, not 
simpliciter, but with a certain forcefulness. Examples like these suggest 
the possibility of a determination relation for particulars, where: 
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p determines q iff for p to exist (in a possible world) is for 
q to exist (there), not simpliciter, but in a specific way. 
As luck would have it, such a relation is already available from Section 
4. When one event strictly or asymmetrically strengthens another, for 
the stronger event to occur in a world is for the weaker to occur 
there, not simpliciter, but in possession of the properties by which their 
essences differ (Section 4, (1)-(3)). So we define p as a determination 
of q iff p strengthens q asymmetrically. 
Perhaps the analogy with properties can be pressed a little further. 
Corresponding to the multiple realisation thesis (M), we have: 
(m) For every mental event m, and every physical event p which 
strengthens m, p strengthens m asymmetrically, i.e., p deter- 
mines m. 
So far we have no analogue for particulars of (S), the mental/physical 
supervenience thesis; but suppose, as an experiment, that: 
(s) Whenever a mental event m occurs, there occurs also a 
physical event p that strengthens m .  79 
There is partial support for this in the supervenience thesis itself. By 
supervenience, each mental property in m's essence is necessitated by 
some underlying physical property. Even if some or all of these physical 
properties are only accidental to m, we can imagine a physical event p 
to which they are all essential, and to which every mental property in 
m's essence is therefore essential, too. Thus every mental property in 
m's essence is also in p's essence. Assuming that p can also be fitted 
out with essential properties to necessitate what few nonmental proper- 
ties might be found in m's essence, p is the physical strengthening of 
m postulated by (s). 
Now the analogy is complete. For every mental event m, (s) guaran- 
tees a physical strengthening p, which by (m) is m's determinate. Since 
the converse is immediate from Section 4, we have: 
(d) A mental event m occurs iff some physical determination p 
of m occurs. 
Assuming (m) and (s), then, the relation of mental to physical events 
effectively duplicates that of mental to physical properties. 
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14. D E T E R M I N A T I O N  A N D  C A U S A L  R E L E V A N C E  
According to the picture I am promoting, whatever has a mental prop- 
erty M has also a determining physical property P, such that to have 
P is to have M in a certain physical way; and whenever a mental event 
m occurs, there occurs also a determining physical event p,  such that 
fo rp  to occur is for m to occur in a certain physical way. Yet it is as true 
as ever that the physical property (event) and its mental counterpart are 
not the same; and this is all the exclusion objection asked for in the 
way of mental/physical separation. How then does it respond to the 
objection to say that the mental item is a determinable of the physical 
one? 
Imagine a pigeon Sophie conditioned to peck at red shapes, and 
them only; a red triangle is presented, and Sophie pecks. Most people 
would say that the redness was causally relevant to her pecking, even 
that this was a paradigm case of causal relevance. But wait! I forgot to 
mention that the triangle in question was a specific shade of red, say 
scarlet. Assuming for argument's sake that the scarlet was already 
causally sufficient for the pecking, the exclusion principle entails that 
every other property was superfluous. So the redness, although it looked 
to be precisely what Sophie was responding to, in reality makes no 
causal contribution whatever. 
Another  example concerns properties of events. Suppose that the 
buildings in a certain region, although built to withstand lesser earth- 
quakes, are in the event of a violent earthquake - one registering five 
or more on the Richter scale - causally guaranteed to fall. When 
one unexpectedly hits, and the bttildings crumble, one property of the 
earthquake that seems relevant to their doing so is that it was violent. 
Or so you might think, until I mention that this particular earthquake 
was merely violent, in the sense of registering over five on the Richter 
scale, but less than six. What with the earthquake's mere violence being 
already sufficient for the effect, that it was violent cannot have made 
any causal difference. 
Surprising results, these! To the untrained eye, the redness and the 
violence are paradigm cases of causal relevance, but it takes only a 
little philosophy to see through them. Yet I take it that our initial 
reaction was the correct one, and that it is the exclusion principle that 
is steering us wrong. What the examples really show is, not that the 
redness and violence are irrelevant, but that determinates do not com- 
pete with their determinables for causal influence. 
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And a good thing, too. For suppose that the competition was real. 
Then practically whenever a determinable Q was prima facie relevant 
to an effect, a causally sufficient determinate Q' of Q could be found 
to expose Q as irrelevant after all. s° But this would hold equally of Q',  
Q", Q", etc. So in the end only ultimate determinates - properties 
unamenable to further determination - could hope to retain their causal 
standing. Or, on second thought, maybe not them either. Not every- 
thing about a cause contributes to its effect, and even where a property 
does contribute, it need not do so in all its aspects. From the examples 
it is clear that such irrelevancies do creep in, as we pass from determin- 
able to determinate; and if the determination process is continued ad 
finem, they may be expected to accumulate significantly. But then 
abstracting some or all of this detail away should leave a determinable 
which, since it falls short of the original only in causally irrelevant 
resepcts, is no less sufficient for the effect. By the exclusion principle, 
this robs even ultimate determinates of their causal powers; and now 
it begins to look as though no property ever makes a causal difference. 
So, the exclusion principle dramatically overstates the potential for 
causal competition between properties. Not that there is nothing right 
about it. In some sense of 'separate', it stands to reason, separate 
properties are causal rivals as the principle says. Well, what if someone 
identifies the appropriate notion of separateness and reformulates the 
exclusion principle accordingly? Suppose it done. Even without hearing 
the details, we know that the corrected principle does not apply to 
determinates and their determinables; for we know that they are not 
causal rivals. Such a position is of course familiar from other contexts. 
Take, for instance, the claim that a space completely filled by one 
object can contain no other. Then are even the object's parts crowded 
out? No, in this competition parts and wholes are not on opposing 
teams, and any principle that puts them there needs rethinking. Like- 
wise any credible reformulation of the exclusion principle must respect 
the truism that determinates and their determinables are not in causal 
competition. 
All of this goes over to particulars mutatis mutandis. Remember 
Archimedes's excited outburst on discovering the principle of displace- 
ment in his bath. That his shouting "Eureka!!"  was causally sufficient 
(let us pretend) for the cat's startled flight cannot be thought to rule it 
out that his (simply) shouting was relevant as well. Equally incredible 
is the suggestion that, granted the causal sufficiency of Socrates's 
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guzz l ing  the poison for his death, his drinking it had no effect. Rather, 
in both these cases, as in the majority of others, the determinate's 
contribution includes the determinable's as a part. Far from being rivals, 
I conclude, for causal influence, determinates and determinables seem 
literally to share in one another's success. 81 
With the exclusion principle neutralised, the application to epipheno- 
menalism is anticlimactic. As a rule, determinates are tolerant, indeed 
supportive, of their determinables' causal aspirations. Why should it be 
different, if the determinate is physical and its determinable mental? 
Suppose that P, the physiological basis of my high spirits, was causally 
sufficient for my grinning. To conclude that its determinable Q, the 
property of feeling happy, was causally otiose, is no better than rejecting 
the redness as irrelevant on the ground that all the causal work was 
accomplished already by its determinate scarlet. And how could it make 
my pain s irrelevant to my wincing, that the latter was guaranteed by 
s's occurring in some specific physical way? s2 
1 5 .  M E N T A L  C A U S A T I O N  
So far our position is wholly negative: for all that the exclusion argu- 
ment shows, mental phenomena can be causally relevant compatibly 
with the causal sufficiency of their physical bases. It is a further question 
whether they will be in any particular case. And even if m is causally 
relevant to an effect y, it is a further question yet whether it actually 
causes y. 
Notice some important differences between causal relevance and 
sufficiency on the one hand, and causation on the other: x can be 
causally sufficient for y although it incorporates indefinite amounts of 
causally extraneous detail, and causally relevant to y even though it 
omits factors critical to y's occurrence. What distinguishes causation 
from these other relations is that causes are expected to be commensur -  
ate with their effects. This makes causation special in another way also: 
determinables and determinates may not compete for causal influence, 
broadly conceived as including everything from relevance to sufficiency; 
but they do compete for the role of cause, with the more commensurate 
candidate prevailing. Now I argue that the effect's mental antecedents 
often fare better in this competitition than their physical counterparts. 
To be commensurate is, nearly enough, to be proportional. Thus 
faced with a choice between candidate causes, one a determinate of 
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the other, the more proportional of the two is, other things equal, to 
be preferred. Which of the contenders proportionality favours depends, 
of course, on the effect in view. Socrates's drinking the hemlock is 
better positioned than his guzzling it to cause his death, but relative to 
other effects proportionality may back the guzzling over the drinking. 
Here is an example more to the present point. In a fit of pique I 
decide to topple the milk pitcher. Epiphenomenalist neuroscientists are 
monitoring my brain activity from a remote location, and an event e in 
their neurometer indicates my neural condition to be thus and such. 
Like any mental event, my decision m has a physical determination p, 
and the question arises to which of these the neurometer reading e is 
due. The scientists reason as follows: because the neurometer is keyed 
to the precise condition of his brain, e would not have eventuated if 
the decision had been taken in a different neural way, in particular if 
it had occurred in p's absence. Therefore m was not enough for e; 83 
and, if it was not enough, it was not e's cause. 
Before announcing this as a victory for epiphenomenalism, we should 
consider how things look from the interactionist's perspective: belief in 
the possibility of mental causation does not entail the commitment to 
find it everywhere; and, in this case, no one would (should) think that 
the mental event was the cause. Recognising that an effect depends not 
just on an event x's occurring, but on its occurring in some quite specific 
manner, we rightly hesitate to assign x causal credit. To treat the meter 
reading as resulting from my decision per se would be like attributing 
Zsa Zsa's citation to her driving through the police radar, or the officer's 
abrasions to her touching his face. 
Then when do we attribute effects to mental causes? Only when we 
believe, I can only suppose rightly, that the effect is relatively insensitive 
to the finer details of m's physical implementation, s4 Deciding to topple 
the pitcher, that is what I do, and the milk spills across the floor. Most 
people would say, and I agree, that my decision had the spill as one of 
its effects. As for the decision's physical determination p, most people 
would also say, and I agree again, that the decision would still have 
been succeeded by the spill if it had occurred in a different physical 
way (because I have taken aspirin, say, or run around the block), s5 
Someone could of course question this seemingly commonsensical 
assumption. But whoever accepts it must reckon with its prima facie 
consequences (where m is my decision, p is the brain event, and s is 
the spill): 
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• rn is a counterexample to s's requiring p (for s would still 
have occurred, if m had occurred without p);  
• p is not proportional  to s (since s does not require it); 
• p did not cause s (since it is not proportional to s); 
• p is not a counterexample to m's enoughness for s (it could 
be a counterexample only if s required it); 
• p is not a counterexample to m's proportionality with s 
(by inspection of the remaining conditions); 
• p poses no evident threat to the hypothesis that m caused 
S. 
And here are the beginnings, at least, of a story in which a mental 
event emerges as better qualified than its physical basis for the role of 
cause. 
16. CONCLUSION 
Indeterminism aside, whatever happens is in strict causal consquence 
of its physical antecedents. But to be causally necessitated is a different 
thing from being caused, and the physical has no monopoly on caus- 
ation. Among causation's prerequisites is that the cause should be 
commensurate with its effect; and part of commensuration is that no- 
thing causes an effect which is essentially overladen with materials to 
which the effect is in no way beholden. This, though, is a condition of 
which would-be physical causes often fall afoul, thereby opening the 
market  up to weaker events with essences bet ter  attuned to the effect's 
causal requirements. Sometimes, these events are mental; and that is 
how mental causation happens. 
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1 Lewis (1986a) and Bennett (1988) are important exceptions. 
2 Actually I will be arguing these points in connection with causes and their causal 
properties only, not effects and theirs. But most of what I have to say applies to effects 
mutatis mutandis. 
3 See Vendler (1962, 1967/1975), Davidson (1967/1980a), Kim (1973), Lewis (1986a), 
and Bennett (1988). 
4 Hume (1968; p. 171). 
5 Mill (1950, Bk. III, Ch. V. §3). True, 
each and every condition of the phenomenon may be taken in its turn and, with 
equal propriety in common par lance . . ,  spoken of as if it were the entire cause. 
And, in practice, that particular condition is usually styled the cause whose share in 
the matter is superficially the most conspicuous, or whose requisitesness to the 
production of the effect we happen to be insisting on at the moment. 
But "philosophically speaking", the cause "is the sum total of the condi t ions. . ,  the 
whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realized, the consequent 
invariably follows" (loc cit.). 
6 Hume (1968, p. 148). 
7 Ibid., p. 149. 
s This is at any rate what they say about general causes - sunlight as the cause of day - 
and there is nothing to suggest that they want to deal differently with the singular case 
- the lightning bolt as the cause of the stampede. Some of Mill's examples are explicitly 
singular, e.g., when a man slips on a ladder his death is due not just to the fall but also 
"the circumstance of his weight" (Mill, loc. cit.). However the situation is complicated 
by the fact that neither author is very attentive to the distinction between singular and 
general causation. 
9 Mill, loc. cir. Assuming that the earlier voting did not influence his thinking, the 
chairman's vote falls short of the true cause in what might be called latitudinal extent: 
extent along lines cross-cutting the lines of causal influence. Building on some enigmatic 
remarks of Hume, Russell (1963) poses an interesting problem of longitudinal extent. 
Normally we think of causes as taking time, the later portions depending on the earlier. 
But unless we are prepared to countenance the temporal equivalent of action at a 
distance, "it would seem that only the later parts can be relevant to the e f f e c t . . . "  (p. 
135). Apparently, then, the earlier portions must be written out as superfluous. An 
analogous argument shows that the only real causation is simultaneous causation! (See 
Hume 1968, pp. 76, 174-75; Ducasse 1969, pp. 44ff.; Taylor 1962-63/1975, p. 41; Lucas 
1962, pp. 63-65; and Beauchamp and Rosenberg 1981, pp. 182ff.). 
l0 Mill (1950, Bk. Ch. III. V, §6). 
ll Davidson (1967/1950a, pp. 155-56): "What is partial in the sentence, 'The cause of 
the match's lighting is that it was struck'", he continues, "is the description of the 
c a u s e  . . . " .  
22 Or at least that is how I would describe the case. Davidson speaks rather of the 
collapse's being caused by the fact that it gave way so suddenly. Further the 'caused' 
here "is not the 'caused' of straightforward, singular causal statements, but is best 
expressed by the words 'causally explains' ", the latter to be understood as a non-truth- 
functional connective (Davidson 1967/1980a, pp. 161-62). To appreciate why he thinks 
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the example needs special treatment, we need to see what his objection is to the "straight- 
forward" reading. The objection in the text is offered as in the spirit of his remarks 
elsewhere. 
13 For an influential early treatment of concreta, see Ducasse (1969, pp. 62ff. and passim). 
Davidson sometimes puts the concrete theory like this: concrete particulars are "endlessly 
redescribable". Presumably the idea is that entities not so redescribable are made in the 
image of language, so "intensional" rather than concrete. Such a view harks back to 
Quine's early criticism of quantified modal logic that it was commited to a realm of 
"dubious entities" insusceptible of analytically inequivalent description (Quine 1953, pp. 
152ff.). As Quine subsequently realized, though, anything that can be talked about at 
all can be specified in analytically inequivalent ways (loc. tit.); hence no ontological 
distinction whatever is marked by the proposed condition. Neither is any distinction 
marked by the redescribability condition, for literally anything, intensions included, can 
be endlessly redescribed. Similarly unhelpful are the following remarks: "[It is wrong to 
think] that we have not specified the whole cause of an event when we have not wholly 
specified it" (Davidson 1967/1980a, p. 156); "[Not] every deletion from the description 
of an event represents something deleted from the event described " (op. tit., p. 157); 
"[A]n event is someth ing . . ,  concrete with features beyond those we use to describe it" 
(Mackie 1974, p. 256); and "causes and effects are events in the sense of concrete 
occurrences exemplifying features over and above the ones we hit upon for describing 
them" (Beauchamp and Rosenberg 1981, p. 248). For again, entities of every sort admit 
of more or less informative description, and none can be described completely. (It was 
a mistake in any case to try to characterise the concrete by a contrast' With the intensional. 
By a concrete ontology is meant 'one too coarse-grained to supply distinct entities for, 
e.g., ' the bolt's snapping' and 'the bolt's snapping so suddenly' to refer to. But Davidson 
nowhere argues, and it is not true, that the rejected distinction can be provided for 
only on an intensional ontology. Like Quine and others reared on the Church/Carnap 
interpretation of quantified modal logic, he tends not to recognise any middle ground 
between the concrete and the intensional, such as the essential could conceivably occupy. 
As a result his own formulations are apt to mislocate his position in the space of 
contemporary options, which is why I have preferred to characterise the concrete theory 
as in the text.) 
14 At least they give the appearance of admitting both types of commensuration. But 
again, interpretation is complicated by their willingness to run particular and general 
causes together. (Relevant texts are Hume (1968, pp. 148-49, 173-75), and Mill (1950, 
Bk. IfI, Chs. VI-X,  passim). See also Hume's remark (1963, pp. 150-51) that "[i]f the 
cause, assigned for any effect, be not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject that 
cause, or add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect". Here 
though Hume seems to be making an epistemological point rather than a metaphysical 
one.)  
15 For example, Hume writes that "where several different objects produce the same 
effect, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst 
them. For as like effects imply like causes, we must always ascribe the causation to the 
circumstances, wherein we discover the resemblance" (1968, p. 174). This leads Davidson 
to speculate that "it is not events, but something more closely tied to the descriptions of 
events, that Hume holds to be causes" (Davidson 1967/1980a, p. 150). A less extreme 
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reaction would be to say that Humean causes cannot, consistently with the passages in 
question, be regarded as concrete events. Kim (1973) and Beauchamp and Rosenberg 
(1981) argue in effect that Hume should have conceived his causes as constitutional 
events given the uses he has in mind for them. 
16 Mill in particular maintaining that "individuals have no essences" (1950, Bk. I, Ch. 
vi, §3). 
17 "[I]t should be clear not only that Hume did not address the question of the ontology 
of causation directly, but that no consistent theory about what kinds of items are causally 
related is likely to emerge solely from textual analysis" (Beauchamp and Rosenberg 
1981, p. 249). 
18 Davidson (1967/1980a,b, p. 150; the example is Mill's). 
19 Bennett  (1988, pp. 81-82). I should point out that I am wilfully misreading Bennett .  
His objection is to the causal relevance of constitution, not in the sense of essence, but 
in the sense of Kim's property-exemplification theory (that he is not himself puzzled 
about the causal relevance of constitution-qua-essence is clear from pages 54ff.). However  
his language can be read as expressing the more general concern raised in the text. 
20 Some of the material in this section is adapted from Yablo (1987). 
21 As usual, a thing's essential properties are those it could not  have existed without. 
22 Lewis, interestingly enough, concedes it for events but not objects. See Lewis (1971; 
1986a). 
23 Notice the parallel with the more familiar occurrent/nonoccurrent and intrinsic/ex- 
trinsic distinctions; categorical/hypothetical is to the model dimension roughly as occur- 
rent/nonoccurrent and intrinsic/extrinsic are to time and space. 
24 To events of the kind stabbing, for example, it is not essential that the victim subse- 
quent dies. So if being of the kind stabbing was allowed into the essence of Brutus's 
stabbing Caesar, there would be no possibility of building up to Brutus's killing Caesar 
by adding in Caesar's subsequent death. 
25 (N) has one other consequence worth noting: 
(7) x ' s  essence = y 's  essence ~ x = y. 
If x and y have the same essence, then each strengthens the other. By (1), they exist in 
the same worlds; by (4), they are coincident in each of these worlds; and now (N) implies 
that they are identical. 
26 Indeed some essential differences entail categorical indiscernibility (Section 4, (4)). 
27 i have given the descriptions wide scope to deflect the common charge that event 
essentialism owes all its plausibility to scope confusions (see Davidson pp. 170-71; Neale 
1990, pp. 145ff.). Thus it might be held that 'necessarily, Brutus's killing Caesar was not 
survived by Caesar '  resembles 'necessarily, the U.S. President is an American citizen' in 
being defensible on the narrow scope reading only. But then 'regarding Brutus's kilting 
Caesar, it could not have been survived by Caesar'  should be just as preposterous as 
'regarding the U.S. President, he could not have failed to be an American citizen'; which 
I submit it is not. 
2s Not that all, or only, the features by which we identify a cause or effect are essential 
to it. To turn a well-known remark of Davidson's to a foreign purpose, "we must 
distinguish firmly between causes and the features we hit on for describing them" (David- 
son 1967/1980a, p. 155). Nobody would think, simply on the basis of their descriptions, 
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that it was essential to the revolutionary upheaval recounted in Ten Days That Shook 
the World to have featured in that work, or accidental to Versailles' most famous post- 
war conference that it involved the European powers. How far a cause's essence can be 
judged from its description is a complicated matter; appearances can and do mislead. 
For example: at first 'the rabbi's noisy praying' and ' the rabbi's noisily praying' may seem 
coreferential. But then a puzzle arises. Much as to speak of the rabbi's blue prayer-book 
is to speak of his prayer-book, identifying it by its color, to speak of his noisy praying is 
to speak of his praying, identifying it by its volume. Accordingly there is no more reason 
to think of his noisy praying as essentially noisy than of his blue prayer-book as essentially 
blue. Yet we can make little sense of a situation in which his noisily praying, though it 
still occurs, is not noisy. So the descriptions are not coreferential after all. This should 
give some idea how unobvious the rules are linking a cause's description to its essence. 
Here are some extremely amateur hypotheses. One, in so-called imperfect nominals (see 
Bennett  1988), the converted verb typically indicates an essential property. Thus Amelia's 
flying to Marseille could not have been a swimming there. Two, whether perfectly nomin- 
alised verbs indicate essential properties depends on whether the verb's perfect form 
amounts to a genuine sortal. Flights are essentially flights; but at least some failures, or 
so we imagine, could have been successes. Three, recalling that perfect nominals are 
modified adjectivally, imperfect nominals adverbially, only the second sort of modification 
connotes essentiality. Thus the heavy fall Amelia took might have been fighter if she had 
managed to catch herself; her falling heavily would not have have occurred at all. 
29 For more on nominalisation, see Vendler (1962; 1967/1975), Kim (1973), Chomsky 
(1975), Thomason (1985), Lewis (1986a), and Bennett (1988, chs. 1 and 2). Kim holds, 
as I do, that 'his praying' and 'his noisily praying' are non-coreferential. However Kim's 
neglect of the perfect/imperfect distinction leads him to class 'his noisy praying' with the 
latter rather than the former. Vendler and Bennett agree with me that 'his noisy praying' 
and 'his noisily praying' are non-coreferential, but only because they construe imperfect 
nominals as standing quite generally for a different type of entity than perfect - facts, 
rather than events. That goes too far. Facts have their reality by timelessly and placelessly 
obtaining, and the rabbi's noisily praying is, like his noisy praying, something that happens 
at a particular time and place. Moreover the rabbi's noisily praying was, like his noisy 
praying, noisy (or we standing outside the rabbi's door would not have heard it); but the 
fact that he prayed noisily was not noisy, and it is not what we hard. (Several authors 
have noticed that (i) 'the rabbi's noisy praying' and (ii) 'the rabbi's noisily praying' seem 
to be related roughly as (iii) ' the cat, which purrs' and (iv) 'the cat's purring'. To 
strengthen the analogy we might try postulating for 'NP, which VPs' and 'NP's VPing' a 
common transformational ancestor; say, 'NP + VP'. Applied to 'the cat + purr', the 
suggested transformations yield (iii) and (iv). Applied to 'his praying + occur in a noisy 
manner' ,  they yield, not (i) and (ii) exactly, but the roughly equivalent (i*) 'his praying, 
which occurs in a noisy manner'  and (ii*) 'his praying's occurring in a noisy manner' .) 
30 Yablo (1987). 
31 Davidson (1967/1980a); Mackie (1974, ch. 10). 
32 See Vendler (1962, 196711975); Kim (1973); Gibbard (1975); Dretske (1977); and 
Bennett (1988). 
33 Perhaps it would be useful to compare the approach taken here with Kim's property- 
exampfification theory. That theory discovers a uniform object-property-time structure 
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in events, and calls events identical iff they have the same constitutive elements. These 
identity-conditions being intraworld only, the theory makes no distinction whatever be- 
tween an event's essential properties and its accidental ones. What our approaches have 
mainly in common, and their principal contrast with the concrete theory, is the insistence 
on fine distinctions between events that are in some attentuated sense ' the same'. How- 
ever only essentialism has a story to tell about what these fine distinctions are - categorical 
indiscernibility tempered by hypothetical difference - and only essentialism can predict 
them on the basis of its analysis of the events themselves. For example, from the essences 
of the bolt 's snapping per  se, and its snapping so suddenly, it follows that they are 
coincident but hypothetically unlike. Given just the object-property-time analyses of these 
events, one has so far not even an interpretation of their 'sameness' ,  much less an 
argument for it. 
34 From this point on, I make a distinction between necessary and essential properties: 
x ' s  necessary properties are those it cannot exist without, and its essential properties are 
those in its essence (see Section 4). Similarly, I distinguish between contingent and 
accidental properties: x ' s  contingent properties are those it can exist without, and its 
accidental properties are those of its contingent properties which are eligible to belong 
to essences, i.e., the cumulative ones. So a property is essential (accidental) iff it is 
necessary (contingent) and also cumulative. Occasionally it may seem that I am treating 
a property P as essential whose cumulativeness is doubtful. In all such cases I should be 
read as speaking rather of pO, defined so that x has p0 in a world iff something coincident 
with x in that world has P there. (From its definition it follows that p0 is categorical, and 
on assumptions defended elsewhere, to be categorical is equivalent to being cumulative 
(Yablo 1987, prop. 3)). For example, I do not maintain that the essence of Brutus's 
killing Caesar includes the property P of causing Caesar's death. Surely in fact P is not 
a property of Brutus's killing Caesar at all; when someone dies as Caesar did, it is not 
the killing that kills him, but the stabbing. What is essential to the killing is to be 
coincident with something, in this case the stabbing, causative of Caesar 's death. But this 
last is a categorical property,  hence cumulative. 
35 Hume (1963, p. 83). This is not of course his preferred description of the causal 
relation; see Lewis (1973/1986b). 
36 Most of the counterexamples are to the condition's sufficiency for causation (Kim 
1974). On the necessity side we have mainly the problem of causal preemption to deal 
with (Lewis 1973/1986b). Preemption happens when, although y results from x, if x had 
not occurred y would still have occurred as the result of some other cause. So x causes 
y but y is not contingent on it. (For reasons developed by Lewis, in some such cases x 
and y do stand in the ancestral of the contingency relation, i.e.,  they are connected by 
a chain of events each contingent on its predecessor. Thus contingency's ancestral comes 
closer to being necessary for causation than contingency itself. I ignore this refinement 
here.) 
37 See Lyon (1967) and Lewis (1973/1986b). All I can offer in defence of my resort to 
an admittedly fallible condition is that: (i) virtually every known condition is fallible; (ii) 
the condition holds in general; and (iii) some such condition will presumably have a place 
in anyone's counterfactual theory of causation. 
as So we opt for the Stalnaker rather than the Lewis variant of the standard semantics 
- allowing, with Stalnaker, that where it is indefinite what the closest P-world is, this 
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can make for indeterminacy in the counterfactual (Stalnaker 1981a, 1981b). Specifically: 
'if it had been that P,  then it would have been that Q'  is true (false) iff on every 
(no) admissible choice of closest P-world, the closest P-world is a Q-world. Might- 
counterfaetuals 'if it had been that P,  then it might have been that Q'  are true iff the 
corresponding would-counterfactuals 'if it had been that P,  then it would have been that 
not-Q'  are untrue, i .e.,  iff on at least one admissible choice of closest P-world, the closest 
P-world is a Q-world. 
39 Lewis (1986a) puts contingency to similar use. 
40 Here  is the argument less metaphorically: as x ' s  essence accumulates causally irrelevant 
properties, the chances increase that x is survived, in the nearest x-less world v, by a 
weakening x -  whose essence falls short of x ' s  essence in causally irrelevant respects only. 
Since x -  preserves x's causally important properties on the scene, y should still occur in 
v, contrary to the contingency condition. 
41 (A1) comes from Lewis (1973/1986b). Since it is Lewis, too, who notices that (A1) is 
trivial when x and y occur, I assume that he is not offering it as an interpretation of 
adequacy. 
42 (A2) is from Mackie (1974). See Lewis (1979/1986c, 1973/1986b) for the argument 
about "back-tracking" counterfactuals. 
43 Rasmussen (1982) contains the only explicit reference to condition (A) I have seen. 
There Rasmussen argues, falliciously I think, that (A) follows from (C) on the hypothesis 
that both x and y occur. 
44 Unlike (A 0 and (A2), (A) is not  formally dual to (C). But it is in an obvious sense 
dual to: 
(c*) if x had occurred, then if it had not occurred, y would not have occurred 
either. 
And  since (C*) is equivalent to (C) in worlds where x exists, they are interchangeable 
as conditions on causation. 
45 See Note  38 for the relation between would- and might-conditionals. I emphasise that 
the deterioration begins only after the snapping is under way because I want it to be clear 
that that very snapping could have been less abrupt (as opposed to: a less abrupt snapping 
could have occurred in its place). To deny this would be to say that the snapping, once 
begun, could not have continued apace, i.e., that the impending acceleration was essential 
to it. As for the further claim that if the snapping had not occurred, it might have been 
less abrupt if it had, suppose if you like that indeterminism holds, and that the mishap's 
objective probability, conditional on preceding events, was vanishingly small. 
46 See Sections 11-12. 
47 Here  is the argument more explicitly: let x -  be the result of deleting some set I of 
causally irrelevant properties from x's  essence, and consider what happens in the nearest 
world w in which x -  occurs in the absence of x. By (1)-(3) of Section 4, x is absent from 
a world iff x -  is either nonexistent,  or lacks some/ -proper ty ,  there. Since x -  does occur 
in w, w is the nearest world in which x -  occurs without some/ -proper ty .  But then the 
question whether y occurs in w is the question whether it would have occurred, if x -  had 
been without some/-proper ty ;  and since the / -proper t ies  are by hypothesis irrelevant to 
y 's  production, the answer must presumably be that it would. Thus there is an event 
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weaker  than  x such that  y would still have occurred if that  event  had  occurred in x ' s  
absence; it follows that  x is not  required by y. 
48 This not ion of enoughness  is prefigured in Dretske and Snyder (1973) and  Anscombe  
(1975). 
49 See Sections 11-12. 
50 Here  is the  a rgument  in full: assume towards a contradiction that  x is required by, 
and enough for, y, a l though x has causally relevant properties R only accidentally; and 
let x + come from x by expanding the  latter 's essence to include these R-properties.  Then  
a case can be made  that  y requires x ÷, too. A n  event  (x+) - strictly weaker  than  x + is 
an event  whose essence falls short  of  x+ ' s  by some combination S of R-properties and 
properties in x ' s  essence. Consider  the  nearest  world w in which (x+) - occurs without 
x +. By (1)-(3) of  Section 4, (x+) - lacks some or all of  the  S-properties in w. But  the  S- 
properties are predominant ly  causally relevant to y (the R-properties by hypothesis ,  and 
the properties f rom x's essence because y requires x). Probably then y does not  occur in 
w. Thus  for an arbitrary weakening (x+) - of x ÷, y would probably not  have occurred if 
(x + ) -  had  occurred without x ÷ . Assuming  (! !) that  each of these probable counterfactuals 
is in fact t rue,  y requires x +. But  this is contrary to our  assumption that  x was enough 
for y. 
sl Le t  x be  unnecessary for y. T hen  the set W of worlds in which y occurs but  x does 
not  is nonempty .  Supposing a suitably rich ontology, x can be weakened  to an event  x -  
existing in all the  x-worlds pins W. Since W contains every world in which x -  occurs 
without x, if x -  had  occurred in x ' s  absence, that  would have been  in some W-world. 
But  y occurs in every W-world, so y would still have occurred if x -  had occurred without 
x. Thus  x -  is a counterexample to the  hypothesis that  y requires x. That  completes the 
a rgument  that  (R) entails necessity on the condition of an  unrestricted ontology. Next 
we argue that  (R) and (E) entail sufficiency on the  same condition. Assume  for contradic- 
tion that  a l though x and y satisfy (R) and (E), x is insufficient for y. By the previous 
result,  we can assume that  x is necessary for y. Because x is not  sufficient for y, the  set 
W of worlds in which x occurs but  y does not  is nonempty.  Ontology being unrestricted,  
x has a s t rengthening x + which differs f rom x only in being absent  f rom these W-worlds, 
i.e., x + occurs in exactly the  x-worlds which contain y. Since x is necessary for y, every 
y-world is an x-world; and since x + exists in every world containing both  y and x, every 
y-world is an x+-world as well. F rom this last it follows that  y requries x +. But  then  x is 
not  enough  for y, contrary to assumption.  
52 Even  if an x necessary and sufficient for y could be found,  they  would not  be "distinct 
existences" in the sense of each being possible without the other. On  most  theories this 
rules out  a causal relation between them (cf H u m e  1968, Bk. I, Part  III, Secs. III and 
XII; and Mackie 1974, Ch. 1). 
53 Here  I assume that  your  entering the market  at the same t ime is, to the  extent  we 
can make  sense of it as a token event at all, something that  could have occurred (e.g.) 
at 4:03 p .m. ;  in this it differs f rom your both entering the  market  at 4 p .m.  
54 This is compatible with there being antecedent  events which causally necessitate the 
accident; what we are looking for is a commensurate antecedent .  For  discussion, see Kim 
(1974), Sorabji (1980), and Lewis (1986a, esp. Sec. VII).  
5s Or, if a cause was for some reason insisted on, we would expect it to be  of an  even 
more  outrd variety than  the  accident itself, and so heir to the same difficulties in more  
aggravated form. 
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56 In this and the next few paragraphs, 'worlds' means: worlds agreeing with the actual 
world in contextually determined background conditions (what the platitude called the 
obtaining circumstances). The notion admittedly bears very little scrutiny and I wish I 
knew how to express my point without it. 
57 Mill (1950, Bk. III, Ch. V, §3). 
5s Related to this, causes of the first sort will be more robust than those of the second, 
in the sense of continuing to operate through a broader range of counterfactual cases. 
Compare Putnam's notion of an "autonomous explanation" in 'Philosophy and Our 
Mental Life': "The same explanation will go in any world (whatever the microstructure) 
in which [the same] higher level structural features are present. In that sense [the] explana- 
tion is autonomous" (Putnam 1975b, p. 296). 
59 Two remarks. First, the world-driven/effect-driven distinction is a relative one; some 
causes are more world-driven than others but none is world-driven in an absolute sense. 
Second, as the examples show, there is no direct correlation between a cause's world- 
drivenness and its strength. What does happen as causes become more world-driven is 
that their essences become more explicit about how the effect's needs were in fact met. 
But this often brings with it a loss of information about what those needs were, and so 
about how it was that what actually happened served to meet them. So although there 
is strengthening along one dimension there may well be weakening along another. 
60 Parts of this and the next two sections are based on Yablo (1992). 
61 Wilson (1969, p. 373). 
62 In case it seems odd to describe the theory just sketched as dualistic, I should explain 
that all I mean by the term is that mental and physical pheg0mena are, contrary to the 
identity theory, distinct, and contrary to eliminativism, existents. That this much dualism 
is acceptable even to many materialists is in a way the point. Having broken with 
Cartesianism over its troubles with mind/body causation, they find to their horror that 
epiphenomenalism lives equally happily on the lesser dualism latent in their own view. 
63 Kim (1983, p. 54). 
64 Schiller (1989, ch. 6). 
65 So 'x'  and 'x*'  become 'X'  and 'X*' ,  and where either is prefixed by 'event', this 
becomes 'property'; 'event y' and 'event z'  are unaffected. Although causes and effects 
are events, properties as well as events can be causally relevant and/or sufficient. I try 
to remain neutral about what exactly causal relevance and sufficiency come to, e.g., causal 
sufficiency could be absolute, or it could be sufficiency-in-the-circumstances. Versions of 
the exclusion argument are found in Malcolm (1968/1982), Goldman (1969), Campbell 
(1970), Honderich (1982), and Kim (1979, 1989). Analogous objections are sometimes 
raised against the causal claims of other phenomena apparently unneeded in fundamental 
physical explanation, e.g., macro- and color-phenomena. The next few sections offer a 
potentially general strategy of response. 
66 Some authors use a slightly different premise: if x is causally sufficient for y, then 
barring overdetermination, no x* ~ x is causally relevant to y. I do not consider this form 
of the argument explicitly, but my response will be easy to guess from what I say about 
the version in the text. 
67 Although (2) could obviously be questioned, I take it that physical determinism isn't 
the issue. For one thing, the conviction that mind makes a causal difference is not 
beholden to the contemporary opinion that determinism is false, and would remain if 
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that opinion were reversed. Second, nothing essential is lost if 'x is causally sufficient for 
y' is replaced throughout by 'x fixes y's objective probability'. So unless the argument 
can be faulted on other grounds, mental causation is problematic under indeterminism, 
too. 
68 An exception is Kim (1984b). 
69 In his (1970/1980a), Davidson advances the token-identity theory as the solution to a 
different problem: singular causal claims need always to be backed by strict causal laws; 
strict laws are always physical laws; physical laws subsume physical events only; therefore 
mental events are inefficacious, unless they are also physical events. 
70 Again, this needs to be distinguished from a quite different worry directed mainly at 
Davidson's (1970/1980a) anomalous monism: singular causal claims always need to be 
backed by some strict causal law; x's causally relevant properties vis-a-vis y are those 
figuring in the antecedent of some such backing law; strict laws never involve mental 
properties; so x's mental properties are causally irrelevant. For discussion, see Stoutland 
(1980), I-Ionderich (1982), Loewer and LePore (1987, 1989), Fodor (1989), Macdonald 
and Macdonald (1986), and McLaughfin (1989) (some of these papers discuss the ex- 
clusion objection also). Note that the exclusion objection assumes nothing about the role 
of laws in causation or in the characterisation of causally relevant properties. 
71 See, e.g., Putnam (1980) and Block and Fodor (1972/1980). 
72 Kripke (1980, p. 147-48) with inessential relettering. 
73 Goldman (1969) and Kim (1989) make related observations. 
74 Johnson (1964, ch. 11), and Prior (1949) are classic discussions. 
75 ,p > Q, is short for: P determines Q. 
76 For example, the property of being salt is equal to the property of being sodium 
chloride, but it is not conceptually necessary that all and only salt is sodium chloride. 
See Putnam (1975a, p. 306); Kripke (1980, pp. ll5ff.);  and Yablo (1992). 
77 Thus P is a determination of Q just in case the traditional relation's first, metaphysical 
component is in place, where this consists primarily in the fact that Ps metaphysically 
must be Qs, but not conversely. Probably it goes too far to identify determination with 
asymmetric necessitation outright, otherwise, e.g., conjunctive properties determine their 
conjuncts and universally impossible properties are all-determining. For dialectical rea- 
sons I try to remain as neutral as I can about where determination leaves off and 
'mere' asymmetric necessitation begins (Prior (1949) reviews some of the history of this 
problem). 
78 (S) is Kim's "strong supervenience" thesis (Kim 1984a). 
79 This may seem doubtful, if one insists on seeing p as (i) a localised brain event, (ii) 
capable of occurring in isolation from anything like its actual neural context. Imagine a 
C-fiber stimulation b realisable in isolated C-fibers afloat in a dish of agar jelly. So 
realised, b involves no sensation of any sort, so if s is a pain sensation, then b does 
not necessitate s, or (therefore) determine it. The moral is not that s has no physical 
determination, but that (i) and (ii) ask too much. Many mental events seem not to be 
locallsable in any specific portion of the brain. Since determination entails coincidence, 
their physical determinations are not localisable either (thus p might be the event of falling 
into a certain overall neurological condition). Arguably no mental event is localisable, but 
if m is an exception, then its physical determination is a localised brain event whose 
essence is partly extrinsic, e.g., the C-fibers' firing in something like their actual neural 
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environment. (So-called "wide content" mental events raise related problems which I 
don't discuss. See Fodor (1987, ch. 2; 1991) and Hell and Mele (1991).) 
so Depending on what exactly the exclusion principle asks in the way of causal sufficiency, 
Q' might be a determinate of Q only in a fairly relaxed sense. Those uncomfortable 
about this should remember the dialectical context: we are trying to show that the 
assumption needed to disempower mental properties, viz., that determinates are causally 
competitive with their determinables, would if true disempower virtually all properties. 
But if the assumption is true with determination strictly interpreted, then it should also 
be true on the looser reading; and the argument in the text now applies. 
sl I do not say that the determinable must be relevant if the determinate is; Yablo (1992) 
gives examples to the contrary. 
s2 Suppose that causal sufficiency is read in some fairly demanding way, e.g., as requiring 
the nomological impossibility of x's occurring without y's doing so. Then no physical 
event p with hopes of determining a mental event m is likely to be itself causally sufficient 
for m's presumed effect e. To causally guarantee e's occurrence, p would need to be 
enormously larger than m in spatial terms (assuming, anyway, that p's essence is not 
unconscionably extrinsic). But that is ruled out by p 's  determining m, and their resulting 
coincidence. Let it be granted, then, that p is not causally sufficient for e; that honour 
fails instead to a spatially far more extensive physical event p*, whose occurrence essen- 
tially requires, in addition to p, that the surrounding physical conditions should be 
approximately as they are in fact. This affects the question of m's causal potency only if 
there is more causal rivalry between m and p* than we found between m and p (namely, 
none). But, how could there be? What dispelled the illusion of rivalry between m and p 
was that p's occurrence consisted, in part, in m's occurrence, and that is as true of m 
and p* as it was of m and p: for p* to occur is for m to occur in a certain physical way, 
and in a certain physical environment. So p* poses no greater threat than p to m's causal 
ambitions. 
s3 Strictly speaking this assumes that each of p's determinables, not just m, is such that 
if it had occurred in p's absence, e would not have ensued (p can counterexample m's 
claim to be enough for e only if e requires it). 
s4 "But sometimes we want to know what is distinctive in an effect's etiology, i.e., how 
it comes about in this world as opposed to others. Then the underlying physical event 
might be exactly what we are after". True enough; see the discussion of world-driven 
causal judgements in Section 12. 
s5 Remember that this makes no prediction about what would have happened, if the 
decision had occurred in whatever physical way, but speaks only of what happens in the 
nearest world in which the decision's physical implementation was not as actually - the 
world in which it undergoes only the minimal physical distortion required to put its actual 
implementation p out of existence. Maybe, of course, we were wrong to think that the 
spill would still have occurred in such a world; in that case, let us hurry to withdraw the 
claim that the decision caused it. 
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